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FOUR UNCHARTERED CORNERS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION
LAW: IN SEARCH OF REMEDIES TO THE SANCTIONING
EFFECT
ANDREW BRADY SPALDING*
This Article is the third installment in a long-term research project
that examines the effects of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in
relation to its underlying policy goals. It first reiterates the various data
points showing that enforcement now has the unintended effect of reducing
investment in higher-corruption markets. Because this amounts to the
withdrawal of capital from developing countries in protest of their political
conditions, I call this the "sanctioning effect." The paper then seeks to push
the envelope of current anti-bribery debates by exploring connections to
four fields of academic inquiry not typically associated with the FCPA.
First, this Article argues that the FCPA deserves a prominent place in the
broader securities law discussion of the "bonding thesis," which examines
why foreign companies enter U.S. capital markets despite higher costs and
liability. The Article explains that because entering the U.S. capital markets
triggers jurisdiction over foreign companies, securities laws that are
designed to induce such listings can help remedy the sanctioning effect.
Second, the Article explores the principle, recently adopted by the Obama
Administration, that corruption is properly understood as a human rights
issue. It argues that truly embracing this principle as the cornerstone of our
anti-corruption agenda would transform FCPA enforcement. Third, the
paper shows that the theories of criminal punishment that explain the
current enforcement regime are general deterrence and incapacitation, and
that these compound the sanctioning effect. It then draws on the
contemporary restorative justice debate to begin sketching the contours of
an alternative paradigm. Finally, the Article describes several examples of
foreign policy concerns dramatically altering FCPA enforcement outcomes
and suggests that a more coherent and transparent treatment of the FCPA's
foreign policy implications may require establishing a new federal office.
The paper provides a preliminary mapping of these uncharted corners in
anticipation of future academic (ad)ventures.
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INTRODUCTION
Counsel to U.S. corporations increasingly remark that enforcement
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)' deters foreign
investment.2 This concern is not new and, perhaps surprisingly, it is not
unique to the corporate community. Since Congress first considered
enacting a prohibition on extraterritorial bribery in the 1970s,
companies and even agencies of the U.S. government have at times
publicly stated that the statute adversely affects U.S. companies doing
business in developing countries.' Typically, this concern is cast in
terms of the impact on U.S. competitiveness-that the FCPA puts U.S.
companies at a competitive disadvantage or, in the oft-used metaphor of
FCPA deliberations, that it upsets the "level[] . . . playing field." 4
Indeed, numerous data sources today confirm that FCPA enforcement
leads to a reduction in investment by U.S. companies (and foreign
companies subject to FCPA jurisdiction) in countries perceived to be
relatively corrupt.
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff
(2006)), amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3,
78ff (2006)); International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff
(2006)).
2. E.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
3 (2011) [hereinafter Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Hearing] (statement of Hon. Robert
C. "Bobby" Scott, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
hear_06142011.html.
3. Id.
4. See The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998
Hearing on HR. 4353 Before the Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials of
the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 1 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 House Finance
Heaingl (statement of Rep. Michael G. Oxley, Chairman, Subcomm. on Fin. &
Hazardous Materials); id. at 4 (Statement of Rep. Tom Bliley, Chairman, H. Comm.
on Commerce).
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However, the discourse of the "competitive disadvantage" and the
"level playing field" frames the discussion of the FCPA's adverse
consequences solely in terms of its effect on business. It makes no
mention of any adverse effects on the countries in which the FCPA
violations occur; these, almost without exception, are developing
countries. Worse yet, the metaphor depicts these countries as mere
"fields" on which multinational corporations "play." But that which
corporations call an "unlevel playing field" and a "competitive
disadvantage" is, from the perspective of developing countries,
something altogether more harmful. This paper is the third installment
in a long-term research project demonstrating that the FCPA now
operates as de facto economic sanctions against developing countries.
This sanctioning effect occurs when FCPA enforcement causes U.S.
corporations to withdraw their capital, however incrementally, from
developing countries. Like the more familiar (de jure) economic
sanctions, this withdrawal of capital too often harms the very people
whom our foreign policy ostensibly seeks to protect-the citizens, or
victims, of corrupt regimes.
This paper seeks to initiate a more radical rethinking of the aims
and methods of international anti-corruption law. It posits that an
effective enforcement regime must deter bribery without deterring
investment; the cornerstone of anti-corruption law, properly
understood, should be the promotion of compliant overseas investment.
The aim should be not merely to wash U.S. corporate hands of
overseas bribery problems, but rather, to engage U.S. corporations in
an anti-corruption regime that more effectively improves the legal and
economic conditions of countries in transition. This paper further
suggests that developing a coherent and effective anti-corruption regime
requires looking well beyond the present confines of anti-corruption
deliberations to areas of law and academic inquiry not customarily
associated with the FCPA. I call these areas the "four unchartered
corners" of anti-corruption law.
Part I will briefly provide the empirical and theoretical basis for
the claim that the present FCPA enforcement regime has a sanctioning
effect in developing countries. Part II provides a series of charts to
begin conceptualizing various approaches to developing a more
effective regime. Part III then describes the four unchartered corners,
5. For the first two installments, see Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony of
International Business Law: U. Progressivism and China's New Laissez-Faire, 59
UCLA L. REv. 354 (2011) [hereinafter Spalding, Irony of International Business Law];
Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation
as Economic Sanctions against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REv. 351 (2010)
[hereinafter Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions].
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or areas of law that can be brought to bear on contemporary FCPA
deliberations. The paper concludes with reflections on the relevance of
the broader legal academic literature to FCPA reform efforts.
I. THE SANCTIONING EFFECT
Three bases exist for believing that FCPA enforcement deters
investment in developing countries: the first is history, the second is
social science, and the third is common sense.
History teaches that even the U.S. government has publicly
admitted to the FCPA's deterrent effect on investment in developing
countries. After the FCPA's enactment in 1977, the U.S. government
began lobbying the developed world to enact a similar prohibition,
ultimately succeeding in 1997 with the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery.6 In testimony before the U.S. Congress, a common
theme was the U.S. business community's loss of business overseas as
a result of the FCPA. In his message transmitting the convention,
President Bill Clinton noted that the United States "has been alone" in
criminalizing overseas bribery and that "United States corporations
have contended that this has put them at a significant disadvantage in
competing for international contracts with respect to foreign
competitors who are not subject to such laws."' Numerous
congressmen testified that the convention would "level[] the playing
field,"' as did SEC Associate Director Paul Gerlach.' Ultimately,
President Clinton would adopt this metaphor in his signing statement."
Moreover, the Clinton administration calculated a very specific estimate
of the amount of business that U.S. corporations were losing. President
Clinton announced that the value of the contracts lost to U.S.
businesses each year as a result of the FCPA was $30 billion." The
6. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, done on Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998).
7. S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43, at III (1998).
8. See, e.g., 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 4, at 1 (statement of
Rep. Michael G. Oxley, Chairman, Subcomm. on Fin. & Hazardous Materials); id. at
4 (statement of Rep. Tom Bliley, Chairman, H. Comm. on Commerce).
9. Id. at 11 (statement of Paul V. Gerlach, Associate Director, Div. of
Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
10. Presidential Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2011 (Nov. 10, 1998), [hereinafter 1998
Presidential Signing Statement].
11. Id.
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Undersecretary of State12 and the General Counsel of the Secretary of
Commerce" included the same figure in their testimony.
The second source is social science. Two sets of empirical studies
on the FCPA found that the statute causes U.S. corporations to do less
business in bribery-prone markets. The first preceded the OECD
Convention and focused on the impact of the FCPA alone, finding that,
controlling for other variables, FCPA enforcement caused a reduction
in business in bribery-prone countries.14 To clarify, the thesis is not that
U.S. companies were investing less overall in developing countries in
1995 than they were in 1976-indeed, such a conclusion would be
absurd and patently unsupportable. Rather, the study found that
companies did less business in such countries than they would if the
FCPA were not enforced. This initial study further found that total
investment in bribery-prone countries did not drop; rather, U.S.
investment was replaced by investment from countries without bribery
prohibitions, a process termed "ownership substitution."" A second set
of studies conducted post-OECD confirmed this finding: as anti-bribery
legislation became more prevalent, bribery-prone countries received
less of their foreign direct investment (FDI) from OECD nations and
more from nations without bribery prohibitions.16 The study found this
pattern in 2005 and then again in 2008."
The third source of evidence for the proposition that FCPA
enforcement leads to a reduction in investment in developing countries
is, quite simply, common sense: if we increase the costs of conducting
business in specific ways, we will of course tend to do less of that
business. Indeed, this sense is captured by the rapid accumulation of
anecdotal evidence in surveys and congressional testimony. A 2009
Dow Jones Risk Compliance survey, announced in a press release
entitled "Confusion About Anti-corruption Laws Leads Companies to
Abandon Expansion Initiatives," found that 51% of companies had
delayed a business initiative as a result of the FCPA and 14% had
12. S. REP. No. 105-19, at 45 (1998) (statement of Hon. Stuart E. Eizenstat,
Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
13. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 4, at 6 (statement of Andrew J.
Pincus, General Counsel to the U.S. Department of Commerce).
14. James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American
Business after 1977 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266,
1995), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5266.pdf.
15. Id. at 20.
16. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares about Corruption?, 37 J. INT'L Bus.
STUD. 807, 818 (2006).
17. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws against Bribery
Abroad, 39 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 634, 635 (2008).
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abandoned an initiative altogether." More recently, a 2011 survey by
the accounting firm KPMG found that among executives surveyed in
the United States and the United Kingdom, "more than 70% ...
agreed there are places in the world where business cannot be done
without engaging in bribery and corruption," and that approximately
30% of the respondents indicated that they deal with this risk by not
doing business in certain countries.
During the June 14, 2011, congressional hearing on amending the
FCPA, Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner observed, "[ij]n 1977, the world
was a very different place. . . . Thirty-four years later, the world has
turned upside-down," and specifically referenced the rise of China.'
Another witness, George Terwilliger, noted that while we are realizing
the goal of heightened compliance with anti-bribery provisions:
[T]here is another less desirable effect . .. when companies
forgo business opportunity out of concern for FCPA
compliance risk. This hurts the creation of [U.S.] jobs and the
ability of U.S. companies to compete with companies
elsewhere that do not have to concern themselves with
uncertainties of the terms and requirements of the FCPA....
[T]here is hidden cost borne of the uncertainties attached
to FCPA compliance risk....
[C]ompanies sometimes forgo deals they could otherwise
do, take a pass on contemplated projects, or withdraw from
ongoing projects and ventures.2 1
Given the multiple sources of data, the question therefore cannot
be whether the FCPA deters investment in developing countries.
Rather, the question is whether the withdrawal of capital is desirable-
that is, whether the effects of this pattern will prove consistent with the
statute's underlying policies. Though the era of meaningful FCPA
enforcement is quite new, we can draw on analogous experiences in
international economic policy to understand the FCPA's likely effects.
18. See Press Release, Dow Jones Risk & Compliance, Dow Jones Survey:
Confusion about Anti-corruption Laws Leads Companies to Abandon Expansion
Initiatives (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://fis.dowjones.com/risk09survey.html.
19. Mike Koehler, Survey Says..., FCPA PROFESSOR (June 2, 2011, 5:25
AM), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/06/survey-says.html (quoting KPMG,
GLOBAL ANTI-BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION SURVEY 2011, at 18 (2011)).
20. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Hearing, supra note 2, at 1 (statement of
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec.).
21. Id. at 37 (statement of George J. Terwilliger III, Partner, White & Case
LLP).
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Given the above evidence, FCPA enforcement today amounts to the
(partial) withdrawal of capital from developing countries in protest of
their political conditions, with the hope that the withdrawal will induce
reforms in that country. The name we otherwise attach to this practice
is, of course, economic sanctions. Because the experience of economic
sanctions is many decades longer, we can look to the literature in
economics and political science to understand the impact of our new de
facto sanctions. I elaborate on this theory at length in two prior papers2 2
and will only summarize it here. The experience of economic sanctions
teaches that when some part of the world sanctions a given country, a
capital void is left. Because the sanctioned country still needs that
capital to stimulate its economic growth, it will look to countries not
participating in the sanctions to fill the void. These latter countries are
sometimes called "black knights"-they rescue the sanctioned country,
but through nefarious means.23
Anti-corruption law is today creating a similar sanctioning effect,
and the principal black knight is China-a country with ample capital,
an aggressive foreign and economic policy, and ineffective anti-
corruption laws.24 When U.S. companies determine that the risk of a
bribery violation is too high, and they withdraw from a project, or a
sector, or a country, the resulting FDI void is frequently filled by
Chinese companies who may engage in bribery without fear of penalty.
The net result is that although U.S. corporations (or foreign
corporations subject to U.S. jurisdiction) are therefore bribing less, the
amount of bribery occurring in developing countries can actually
increase. In enforcing the FCPA, we often create the very conditions in
which corruption proliferates. Having previously developed this theory,
this paper now seeks to begin fashioning remedies.
II. POINTING TOWARD REMEDIES
The sanctioning effect represents a sort of confusion concerning
the interplay between the various policy goals of anti-corruption
enforcement. The following matrix seeks to clarify these goals and their
interrelationships. It can help get us headed down the right path in
thinking about how to enforce corruption prohibitions in ways that
remedy the sanctioning effect.
22. See Spalding, irony of International Business Law, supra note 5;
Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions, supra note 5.
23. See Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions, supra note 5, at 397.
24. See Spalding, Irony of International Business Law, supra note 5, at 360-
61.
2012:661 667
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
The columns represent two categories of goals: normative (our
goals with relation to an anti-corruption norm) and economic. Some of
these goals are explicit in the statute; others are articulated in the
legislative debates; while others are perhaps more tacit, but still
uncontroverted. This paper will reserve for another day a lengthier
defense of each of these goals; here, I merely posit them, and assert
that they generally would elicit very little disagreement in the
international business and anti-corruption communities. The rows
represent two sets of actors: the corporations subject to FCPA
jurisdiction, and the countries in which alleged FCPA violations occur
(which, again, are almost exclusively developing countries).
Accordingly, this chart posits that with respect to corporations, our
normative goal is to promote compliance with an anti-corruption norm,
while the economic goal is to enable overseas investment. With respect
to developing countries, our normative goal is to promote the adoption,
in practice, of an anti-corruption norm, while our general economic
goal is to promote economic growth. I submit that we can generally
agree on these four goals of anti-corruption law. My critique of our
current FCPA enforcement regime concerns the interrelationships
between goals [1], [2], and [3].
Normative Goals Economic Goals
FCPA 1: Compliance with 2: Overseas Investment
Corporations: Norms
Developing 3: Adoption of Norms [4: Economic Growth]
Countries: I
The empirical evidence cited above generally demonstrates that an
increase in [1] has caused a decrease in [2]. That is, our efforts to
promote compliance with the FCPA have led to a decrease in
investment in developing countries. This does not necessarily reflect
negligence on the part of our enforcement agencies; plainly, the statute
charges the SEC and DOJ with enforcing the statute against corporate
violators and thereby promoting their compliance. Strictly speaking, [1]
is their job; [2] and [3] are not.
The focus of this paper is the impact of this dynamic on [3]. That
is, when we enforce compliance in such a way that investment in
developing countries decreases, what is the impact on developing
countries' adoption of anti-corruption norms? The answer lies in the
existence of black knights, especially China. When we pursue corporate
compliance in a way that deters investment, the black knights often
move in and engage in rampant corruption. As a result, though bribery
by U.S. corporations may have decreased, the total amount of bribery
668
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in the developing country has increased. When [1] causes a decrease in
[2], it in turn causes a decrease in [3]. A myopic focus on compliance,
without regard to its impact on investment, jeopardizes our effort to
promote anti-corruption norms across the developing world.
The remedy, then, is to enforce compliance while promoting
overseas investment. We must develop an enforcement regime that
deters bribery without deterring investment in countries with
comparatively high rates of corruption. The only way to promote
adoption of anti-corruption norms in developing countries is to actively
engage in developing countries in a manner consistent with the anti-
corruption norm. The above matrix is designed to suggest a very
simple-perhaps embarrassingly simple-lesson: [1] + [2] = [3].
Through our presence, and not our absence, we can more effectively
promote anti-corruption norms.
The remainder of this paper thus begins rethinking anti-corruption
enforcement. It starts from the premises that current enforcement exerts
a downward push on investment in certain countries, that companies not
subject to anti-corruption norms often fill the void, and that a regime
dedicated to promoting both compliance and investment is in the
interest of both the United States and the countries in which U.S.
companies do business. The next chart provides a preliminary mapping
of the various paths to remedying the sanctioning effect and achieving
more effective anti-corruption enforcement.
At the bottom of the chart are three sets of actors: U.S. companies
(i.e., companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction), foreign companies (unlike
the above matrix, here I will treat U.S. companies and foreign
companies separately), and the foreign officials who solicit bribes. The
map further suggests two broad categories of anti-corruption laws: U.S.
law (principally the FCPA) and foreign laws (principally other
countries' domestic laws, often enacted pursuant to international
conventions). When considering how these various laws apply to the
various actors, four distinct paths emerge: (1) U.S. companies are
subject to U.S. law; (2) certain foreign companies are also subject to
U.S. jurisdiction (e.g., a foreign company listing on a U.S. exchange
becomes subject to FCPA jurisdiction); (3) foreign companies are
subject to their own laws; and (4) foreign officials are also subject to
their own laws. A comprehensive anti-corruption regime would seek to
deter corruption in each of these four ways.
6692012:661
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REMEDIES TO THE
SANCTIONING EFFECT
U.S. LAW FOREIGN LAWS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
U.S. FOREIGN FOREIGN
COMPANIES COMPANIES OFFICIALS
However, the prospects for reform are not equally likely for each
of these paths. Indeed, I have structured this chart to present the four
paths in the order in which effective reforms appear most likely: (1)
reforms to U.S. law governing U.S. companies are most likely, as
Congress is considering certain reforms now;25 (2) the application of
U.S. law to foreign companies is discussed perhaps less frequently, but
will inevitably result from this reform movement; (3) we are beginning
to see foreign countries follow the U.S. lead in enforcing their own
extraterritorial anti-bribery laws,26 though black knights such as China
are perhaps many years or even decades from systematic enforcement;2 7
and (4) the effective enforcement of other countries' domestic anti-
bribery laws against its own officials is the most remote, for the simple
reason that the officials who need to enact and enforce such laws are
themselves the beneficiaries of bribery. Accordingly, the first three
paths are the most fruitful areas of inquiry and are the areas that the
remainder of this paper explores.
III. FOUR UNCHARTERED CORNERS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW
In rethinking anti-corruption enforcement, this paper moves well
beyond the existing confines of anti-corruption deliberations. Rather
25. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Hearing, supra note 2, at 19-20
(statement of Hon. Michael Mukasey, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP).
26. See, e.g., FRITZ HEIMANN & GILLIAN DELL, TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
PROGRESS REPORT 2010: ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 66-
67 (2d ed. 2010), available at http://www.transparency.cz/doc/
2010ProgressReport 2nd edition_10.9.10.pdf.
27. See Spalding, Irony of International Business Law, supra note 5, at 410.
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than focusing on the FCPA-specific issues of facilitating payments or
the good-faith compliance defense, we can venture into areas of legal
academic debate not typically associated with the FCPA. In particular,
four areas of legal academic inquiry prove rich in new ideas to
incorporate into our contemporary discussion of anti-corruption reform.
These four unchartered corners, if you will, of anti-corruption law
include existing academic literatures in securities law, international law,
criminal law, and administrative law.
A. Securities La w. Inducing Foreign Companies to Enter U S. Public
Capital Markets
One way that foreign companies become subject to FCPA
jurisdiction is by listing on U.S. exchanges.28 Accordingly, to the extent
that foreign-particularly Chinese-companies list on U.S. exchanges,
the sanctioning effect goes away: all companies become subject to a
common anti-corruption legal regime. For years, corporate law
scholars have debated why we see foreign companies listing on U.S.
exchanges despite the higher listing expenses, compliance costs, and
potential liability for securities fraud.29 The governing theory to explain
this phenomenon is the bonding hypothesis, which holds that in listing
on U.S. exchanges, foreign companies commit themselves to higher
disclosure standards and to the protection of minority investor rights.30
This occurs in three basic ways: (1) in becoming subject to the
jurisdiction of the SEC, they are obligated to higher disclosure
standards and are subject to the SEC's enforcement authority; (2) they
in effect provide to their investors the legal remedies of class actions
and derivative actions that are largely absent in their home
jurisdictions; and (3) they are exposed to the scrutiny of reputational
intermediaries such as underwriters, auditors, debt rating agencies, and
securities analysts, which are also positioned (often better than the
SEC) to expose financial wrongdoing.31
The hypothesis has been the subject of some controversy, and with
respect to China, it will shortly be tested. The number of Chinese
28. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
29. See Anthony Lin, The Lure of a U.S. Listing Remains Powerful for
Some Chinese Companies, AM LAW DAILY (Mar. 15, 2011, 12:59 PM),
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/03/asianlawyer03l5.html.
30. John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-
Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance 28
(Columbia Law Sch.: The Ctr. For Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 205,
2002), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 315840.
31. Id.
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companies going public in the United States is expected to skyrocket,
while at the same time the costs of such companies listing in the United
States is proving perhaps more costly than many anticipated. As of
November 2010, the total number of Chinese companies listed on the
major U.S. exchanges was 226. However, an estimated 5,000 public
companies will enter the public capital markets in the next ten to fifteen
years." To the extent that these companies go public in the United
States, they cease to be black knights and the sanctioning effect is
neutralized.
However, we are also now learning hard lessons about the listing
costs to Chinese companies. In the first half of 2011, about forty
Chinese companies either admitted accounting problems or had the SEC
or U.S. exchanges halt trading in their stocks because of accounting
questions.3 4 Relatedly, in mid-2010 a pronounced trend began of
securities class action filings against Chinese companies.
We are just beginning to understand the causes of this trend. A
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) report
indicated a systemic problem of U.S.-registered accounting firms
failing to conduct audits of Chinese companies in full compliance with
PCAOB standards.36 The report named several obstacles to adequate
auditing of Chinese companies: difficulty understanding the local
language, time, and expense associated with travel to the country;
difficulty in understanding the local business environment; and the
tendency to outsource auditing to native firms and then rely too heavily
on their findings.37 Though the PCAOB has articulated standards for
relying on foreign firms to audit local companies, these standards are
not uniformly followed. Moody's recently issued a report identifying a
series of red flags prevalent in Chinese public companies, including
32. Kevin LaCroix, U.S. Listed Chinese Companies Attracting Scrutiny,
Securities Suits, D&O DIARY (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/1 1/
articles/subprime-litigation/us-listed-chinese-companies-attracting-scrutiny-securities-
suits/.
33. Aaron Lucchetti, U.S. Falls behind in Stock Listings, WALL ST. J., May
26, 2011, at Al.
34. Michael Rapoport, Auditors Facing 'Reverse' Inquiry, WALL ST. J., June
3, 2011, at C1.
35. Kevin LaCroix, Identifying Chinese Characters: Accounting Fraud
Lawsuits against Chinese Companies Surge, D&O DIARY (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2011/04/articles/securities-litigation/identifyig-chinese-
characters-accounting-fraud-lawsuits-against-chinese-companies-surge/.
36. PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., ACTIVITY SUMMARY AND AUDIT
IMPLICATIONS FOR REVERSE MERGERS INVOLVING COMPANIES FROM THE CHINA REGION:
JANUARY 1, 2007 THROUGH MARCH 31, 2010 (2011), available at http://pcaobus.org/
Research/Documents/ChineseReverseMergerResearchNote.pdf.
37. Id. at 2.
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weak corporate governance and poor quality in the financial
statements.38 In the wake of these revelations, the SEC began an
investigation of the accounting firms that audit U.S.-listed Chinese
companies.39 This exposure of widespread accounting impropriety in
Chinese firms may serve to increase the practical costs of listing in the
United States, potentially deterring future listings.
A second challenge to the bonding thesis arises from the 2010
U.S. Supreme Court case of Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd.,' which held that Rule lOb-5 applies only to the purchase or sale
of securities on U.S. exchanges or otherwise in the United States." The
opinion retracted the extraterritorial scope of securities fraud liability
by overturning decades of case law that based extraterritorial
jurisdiction on the effects and conducts tests. In doing so, Morrison
significantly increases the incentives for foreign companies to not list
on U.S. exchanges-the new law makes avoidance of lOb-5 liability
significantly easier for companies based outside the United States. This
decision will tend to push firms with weaker securities fraud liability
laws away from U.S. exchanges, and thus to a significant extent keep
them beyond the bounds of FCPA jurisdiction.
I want to suggest that the sanctioning effect provides another and
independent reason to induce foreign firms to list on U.S. exchanges.
Despite the increasing disincentives for Chinese companies to list in the
United States, we should commit to the policy of incentivizing Chinese
companies to enter the U.S. public capital markets. Doing so is in the
United States' interest for two distinct but closely related reasons: (1) it
makes U.S. companies more competitive; and (2) it allows the United
States to more effectively promote anti-bribery, anti-fraud, and related
norms in developing countries.
More specifically, inducing Chinese listings could become a
substantial part of a broader effort to neutralize the black knights of
anti-corruption law and reduce the sanctioning effect. Further research
should examine the historical justifications for allowing foreign firms to
list, explore the policy tradeoffs, and consider whether the sanctioning
effect might lead us to tinker with the costs and benefits of listing.
38. Kate O'Keeffe, Moody's Raises Some 'Red Flags' in China, WALL ST. J.,
July 12, 2011, at C2.
39. See Rapoport, supra note 34.
40. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
41. Id. at 2881-82.
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B. International Law: Beyond Regional Economic Crime to Universal
Human Rights
A second way to subject non-U.S. corporations to meaningful anti-
bribery law is to build a more universal legal regime. Anti-bribery law
historically has been enforced by nations pursuant to regional
conventions. It began with the adoption of the FCPA, followed by the
OECD's adoption of the anti-bribery convention. Other regional
organizations, such as the African Union and the Organization of
American States, have similarly adopted anti-corruption conventions.
So, too, has the focus of anti-bribery legislation and enforcement been
on the perpetrators-the companies. The FCPA was originally
motivated by the perception that revelations of U.S. companies paying
bribes tarnished the image of the United States specifically and
capitalism generally; that statute, and the OECD Convention that
followed, thus focused on ensuring the payors' compliance with these
norms, rather than protecting the victims of systemic bribery.
But President Barack Obama has recently indicated a shift in focus
that, while subtle, is radical in principle. Obama's 2010 National
Security Strategy4 2 outlines a set of strategies to "Promote Democracy
and Human Rights Abroad."43 Among them is "Strengthening
International Norms Against Corruption."" There, the President makes
a fairly new claim: "that pervasive corruption is a violation of basic
human rights."45 The report claims that the administration is working
with other organizations, such as the United Nations, G-20, OECD,
and international financial institutions, to protect this right, and it
provides a number of more specific tactics promoting transparency in
transactions within and between institutions.46 The report in effect
announces, as a matter of official policy, that freedom from corruption
is a new universal human right.
The report is less a rigorous policy paper than a political pamphlet,
and it focuses on anti-corruption measures broadly and not the FCPA
specifically. But the FCPA is almost certainly the single biggest
component of the U.S. government's anti-corruption enforcement effort
today, and the rights theory has potentially radical implications for
FCPA enforcement. If the principal focus of FCPA enforcement is
42. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, WHITE HOUSE (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/national-security strategy.pdf
[hereinafter OBAMA REPORT].
43. Id. at 37.
44. Id. at 38.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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protecting human rights violations, then our emphasis must shift from
the corporations to the victims in developing countries. It would require
focusing not merely on ensuring simply that U.S. corporations do not
participate in bribery, but on the additional goal of reducing bribery in
developing countries. Jurisdiction over corporations, and the
punishment of corporations, becomes a means rather than an end: we
punish corporate bribery not merely to wash our hands of foreign
countries' problems, but to actually reduce corruption in those
countries.
Were this the guiding principle of enforcement, the sanctioning
effect would constitute an unmitigated policy failure. To the extent that
U.S. corporations withdraw from projects, sectors, or markets, and
companies not subject to bribery liability fill the void, the enforcement
effort would be understood as precipitating human rights violations.
Shifting to a human rights emphasis would call for reforms in our
enforcement regime that could remedy the sanctioning effect. So too
would it constitute a movement away from thinking about bribery in
merely ethical or economic terms; human rights is an entirely different
dimension to the policy analysis. A rights-based FCPA regime,
moreover, could become an integral part of a broader movement to
promote human rights through overseas corporate conduct. The U.N.
has just adopted the "Guiding Principles for Business and Human
Rights," 47 and OECD nations have recently committed to a new, more
exacting set of guidelines for corporations in respecting human rights.4
Similarly, a shift to human rights would, in turn, move the focus
away from regional organizations and toward the prospect of universal
anti-corruption law. The potential for a universal regime currently lies
in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which
takes a comprehensive approach to combating corruption. Its very first
substantive section concerns "preventive measures," and includes
detailed sections on establishing preventive anti-corruption
governmental bodies, the effective training of civil servants, and the
participation of NGOs.' It calls for the criminalization of both the
supply and the demand of bribes. o It moves beyond bribery to prohibit
47. See Press Release, U.N. Human Rights, Office of the High Comm'r, New
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights Endorsed by the UN Human Rights
Council (June 16, 2011), http://www.business-humanrights.org/medialdocuments/
ruggie/ruggie-guiding-principles-endorsed-16-jun-201 1.pdf.
48. OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011),
available athttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf.
49. United Nations Convention against Corruption, opened for signature Oct.
31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, 148-54, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/
publication/UNTS/Volume%202349/v2349.pdf.
50. Id. at 154.
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money-laundering, embezzlement, trading in influence, abuse of power,
etc."
Most importantly, 159 states are currently parties to the
convention.52 The U.N. is currently conducting biannual conferences to
promote implementation of the convention.53 If the United States were
to premise its anti-bribery enforcement on the assumption that bribery
violates a human right, it would naturally shift from an emphasis away
from DOJ enforcement of a white-collar criminal statute pursuant to a
regional convention, and toward an emphasis on global recognition of
the U.N. Convention. A future paper will explore whether freedom
from corruption has become the new universal human right and, if so,
the implications for anti-corruption policy broadly, particularly the
FCPA.
C. Criminal Law: A New Theory of Criminal Punishment for
International Corporate Bribery
My interviews with practitioners across Asia54 revealed a common
perception: that FCPA enforcement does little to benefit the countries
in which the bribery occurs. Several interviewees described the U.S.
enforcement process, and particularly the imposition of monetary
penalties, as merely a means of padding the U.S. Treasury and
offsetting the budget deficit. Enforcement may benefit the United
States, but does nothing to benefit the victims-the citizens of
developing countries.
This criticism points to a more fundamental peculiarity of FCPA
enforcement: the true victims of the crime are not within the
jurisdiction of the enforcement agencies; they have no nexus to the
United States. The DOJ and SEC can reach foreign companies through
various jurisdictional hooks, but have no formal authority over, or
statutory responsibility for, the citizens of foreign countries. We may
hold out as a consolation prize the doctrine of general deterrence, and
this is certainly not without value. But it does little to mitigate the
51. Id. at 155-57.
52. See UNCAC Signature and Ratification Status of as Od6anuary2012, U.N.
OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/
signatories.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
53. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, THIRD SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE
OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION:
PROVISIONAL AGENDA AND ANNOTATIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/treaties/CAC/CAC-COSP-session3.html#report.
54. This paper was made possible in large part by a Fulbright Senior Research
Grant in 2009-10, in which the author traveled throughout Asia studying the impact of
anti-bribery enforcement in developing countries.
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perception that FCPA enforcement principally benefits the country that
committed the bribery-indeed, our practice gives rise to the perception
that just as bribery is exploitative of developing countries, so too is
anti-bribery enforcement. This problem-that developing countries do
not reap the full benefits of FCPA enforcement-is compounded
substantially by the sanctioning effect. Not only do these countries not
benefit from the collection of criminal penalties, but, as explained
above, enforcement will often create the conditions in which companies
not subject to meaningful anti-corruption laws will enter the markets
and exploit the countries without liability for corruption and other
socially destructive conduct.
This problem is further compounded by the theory of criminal
punishment that apparently underlies current FCPA enforcement. Two
theories of punishment best explain the U.S. government's current
approach: deterrence and incapacitation. Through the imposition of
severe criminal fines and other penalties, the government seeks to both
specifically and generally deter future wrongdoing. Where the threat of
these penalties increases the costs of doing business in corruption-prone
countries to the point that companies can no longer afford the risk, the
sanctioning effect constitutes a kind of incapacitation.
I want to suggest that the sanctioning effect reflects failed theories
of criminal punishment, and that effective anti-bribery enforcement
requires a radically different paradigm. A more effective enforcement
regime would not only penalize the bribe payors, but also would more
directly benefit the countries in which the bribery occurs. The seeds of
such a regime may well exist in a contemporary criminal law movement
known as restorative justice.
Restorative justice has been defined as "a process whereby all the
parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve
collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its
implications for the future."" It is a new model of criminal justice that
offers an alternative to both retribution and rehabilitation." The process
generally involves moral learning, community participation, respectful
dialogue, forgiveness, responsibility, apology, and making amends."
The stakeholders are generally the victim(s), the offender(s), and the
affected communities, and the process thus aims to restore victims,
offenders, and communities.
55. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 11
(2002).
56. Id. at 10.
57. Id. at 11.
58. Id.
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The movement emerged in the 1970s in response to widespread
perceptions that the criminal justice system "neither effectively deterred
crime nor successfully rehabilitated offenders."" It began in European
and former commonwealth countries (United States, Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, Netherlands, Austria, and others) as a way of
addressing individual crimes committed domestically (theft, assault,
etc.). However, in the 1990s restorative justice practices moved from
individual acts of wrongdoing to systematic wrongdoing by state actors,
such as civil wars and illegitimate regimes such as apartheid.' Since
then, more than twenty-five developing countries have instituted
variations of restorative justice principles to heal from large-scale
crimes in which the state participated."
As it has evolved in practice and applied to larger-scale social and
political interaction, several core concepts have emerged. Both the
offender(s) and the victim(s) participate directly and personally in a
process of speaking about their role in the crime and listening to the
other's narrative. Each talks about what occurred, why it occurred, and
the harm it caused. The offender acknowledges his conduct and its
wrongfulness and apologizes to the victim(s). The victim(s) thus draw
into a deeper understanding of the causes, sometimes systemic, of the
crime, and can sometimes work toward an attitude of forgiveness (but
not forgetfulness) of the act. All persons contribute to a determination
of the appropriate restitution; among the goals of restitution is the
reintegration of the wrongdoer into the larger community. Ideally, the
wrongdoer and the victim achieve a degree of reconciliation and a
shared understanding of appropriate social norms. Both then try to
adopt a future-oriented perspective that focuses on the rebuilding of
social relationships.62 These practices expose deeper truths about state-
sanctioned criminality, allow for deeper understandings among the
perpetrators and the victims, and can allow a society to "begin anew
with transformative understandings of both its past and its future."" It
may also reduce recidivism, as some data suggest that restorative
justice participants "are more likely to develop fellow-feeling, empathy,
and a sense of moral responsibility, mutuality, and reciprocity."' Both
victims and offenders report a higher satisfaction with the restorative
59. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restoradve Justice: What Is It and Does It
Work?, 3 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 161, 163 (2007).
60. Id. at 169.
61. Id. at 164.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 169.
64. Id. at 170.
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justice process, sometimes by a factor of three or four. Ultimately,
scholars believe that restorative justice can enhance "community norm
development,"' as studies suggest that the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) in South Africa contributed to the development of a
"human rights consciousness" among those who viewed the
proceedings.
Just as the early restorative justice advocates maintained that the
conventional punishment paradigm failed to deter wrongdoing,
rehabilitate offenders, or reintegrate the wrongdoer into the harmed
community, the sanctioning effect thesis holds that our current
punishment regime has precisely this effect. Corporations withdraw
from developing countries without learning, much less teaching, how to
conduct business there without bribery. Because of this withdrawal,
black knights move in and the overall level of bribery is not reduced;
indeed, it may well increase. And the victims of bribery-the citizens
of developing countries-often feel that they did not participate in,
much less benefit from, the punishment process.
A restorative model of criminal punishment could greatly improve
the effectiveness of anti-corruption enforcement. Rather than remedying
these problems by de-criminalizing bribery or otherwise dialing back
enforcement, a new paradigm of criminal punishment might allow us to
more effectively promote an anti-corruption norm while still punishing
violations. A public dialogue between the participants of a bribery
scheme-the corporation and the state-could greatly enhance our
public understanding of the underlying systemic causes of bribery.
Agencies could fashion penalties that the corporations perceive as
legitimate and proportional, enforcement agencies perceive as fair, and
victims perceive as helpful. Outcomes could be more carefully tailored
to specific communities in which the corruption occurs. The ultimate
goal would be the promotion of an anti-corruption norm in developing
countries, the deterrence of bribery by corporations, and the effective
reintegration of the corporation into the developing country while
embodying ethical, transparent business practices.
The anticipated counterargument is that restorative justice is
designed for traditional crimes committed by natural persons rather
than corporate crime, and that application to large corporations is
neither functionally possible nor normatively appropriate. However,
history has already proven that the paradigm can be applied to the state,
which of course is an organization that is larger, more bureaucratically
65. Id. at 174.
66. Id. at 170.
67. Id. at 173-74.
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complex, and more powerful, than any multinational corporation. If
restorative justice can apply to states, why could it not, or should it not,
apply to corporations? Indeed, preliminary research on this very point
has already occurred. One of the founders of the restorative justice
movement, John Braithwaite of Australia National University, has
argued for its applicability to corporate crime .68 He finds that when
state regulators participate in negotiations with corporate managers or
industry leaders, the resulting enforcement actions are more flexible
and realistic, and the punishment is generally much more effective than
traditional deterrence measures in promoting corporate compliance.69
Moreover, FCPA enforcement has, perhaps unwittingly, supplied one
high-profile example of a quasi-restorative approach to criminal
enforcement. In settling the case of James Giffen, the United States
arranged with officials in Kazakhstan and Switzerland to release the $80
million in alleged bribes from their Swiss accounts and establish a trust
fund to be managed by a Kazakhstan NGO. 0 This fund was to be used
to pay for programs for poor children and improve transparency in the
Kazakhstan oil industry." Although this example did not result from a
TRC-type tribunal, it does indeed reflect a belief that the aim of
punishing bribery should be social rehabilitation. The capacity to fund
such educational programs is enormous, given that roughly half of the
DOJ's criminal penalties receipts come from the FCPA.n
Ultimately, a more effective criminal enforcement regime requires
a reconceptualization of criminal justice in a way that promotes the
adoption of norms through the presence of compliant businesses, rather
than their coerced withdrawal. The Kazakhstan example represents just
one component of a potentially broader alternative criminal justice
regime, in which corporate bribe payers are reintegrated into the very
society in which they committed the criminal conduct. A process of
dialogue and reform can educate the public on the nature of corruption,
induce the corporation to implement necessary reforms, penalize the
corporation in ways that benefit the local community, and work toward
creating a set of business practices that comply with anti-corruption
norms. Starting from this foundational principle, future scholarship can
develop the details of a restorative justice procedure for international
corporate crime in general, and anti-corruption law in particular.
68. Id. at 169.
69. Id.
70. Michael Steen, Kazakh "Oil Bribe" Millions to Go to Poor Children,
REUTERS (May 4, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/05/04/idUSLO4489030.
71. Id.
72. Mike Koehler, Federal Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement in 2010. Big,
Bold, and Bizarre, 6 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. 166, 166 (2011).
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D. Administrative Law: Do We Need a New Federal Agency?
As noted above, the sanctioning effect suggests that our
enforcement of international bribery is not merely a white-collar crime;
it raises delicate and complicated questions of foreign policy. However,
criminal enforcement of anti-bribery law is presently entrusted entirely
to the Fraud Section of the U.S. DOJ's Criminal Division, an office
with a very aggressive prosecutorial mission and culture. It is neither
designed nor inclined to carefully consider the nuances of foreign
policy; we have entrusted the deployment of a highly powerful foreign
policy tool to an agency that does not claim foreign policy expertise.
Despite the DOJ's supposedly exclusive authority to prosecute
criminal FCPA violations, recent enforcement actions very strongly
suggest that foreign policy considerations, almost certainly from outside
the DOJ, have been brought to bear on FCPA enforcement. However,
the adjustment of enforcement outcomes in response to foreign policy
imperatives has been secretive and ad hoc, raising substantial questions
about the rule of law. This Section will describe three of those
enforcement actions, and how the outcomes seemingly reflected foreign
policy pressures of mysterious origins. This Section will then suggest
that a coherent international anti-corruption agenda may require a new
federal agency.
The limitations-or perhaps, the excesses-of the prosecutorial
mindset in the context of international anti-corruption policy became
apparent in the recent prosecution of U.S. attorney James Giffen.
Giffen had worked in U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War and
eventually concentrated his energies in Kazakhstan, working his way
into the inner circles of power." When Kazakhstan became an
independent nation in 1991, it immediately began selling rights to its
vast oil and gas reserves to international oil companies.7 In 1995,
Giffen was named a Counselor to the President of Kazakhstan, enabling
him to become the go-to guy for western companies seeking to obtain
new contracts with the Kazakh government."
Not surprisingly, Giffen was arrested in March of 2003 and
charged, inter alia, with violating the FCPA.76 The charging documents
alleged that between 1995 and 1999, Giffen made unlawful payments
73. Mike Koehler, The Giffen Gaffe-The Final Chapter, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Nov. 22, 2010), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/11/giffen-gaffe-final-
chapter.html.
74. United States v. Giffen, 326 F. Supp. 2d 497, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
75. Id. at 499-500.
76. See id. at 500. He was also charged with mail and wire fraud and money
laundering. Id.
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totaling approximately $80 million in cash and luxury items to high-
ranking Kazakh officials to obtain business for various international oil
companies including Mobil, Amoco, and Texaco." He allegedly
concealed these payments through a complex set of financial
transactions through Swiss banking accounts.
Once in court, Giffen shockingly argued that he bribed Kazakhstan
officials with the full approval of the U.S. government." He requested
the production of documents to support a "public authority defense," an
affirmative defense under which a defendant must prove that he acted in
reliance on actual authority from an adequately empowered government
official.o After extensive delays, the government issued what the judge
deemed a "substantial volume" of classified information under the
Classified Information Protection Act, which the court promptly put
under seal."
In what Professor Mike Koehler called "a mysterious turn,"82 the
DOJ ultimately resolved the case seven years later, in August of 2010,
through a one-paragraph superseding information charging only a
misdemeanor tax violation to which Giffen pled guilty.83 Giffen
received neither a fine nor probation, much less jail time, and was fined
$32,000 for donating two snowmobiles to an unnamed Kazakhstan
77. Id. at 499; see also Indictment at 2-3, 46, Giffen, 326 F. Supp. 2d 497
(No. S2 03 Cr. 404), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/giffen/08-04-04giffen-second-
superseding-indict.pdf.
78. Giffen, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 499-500.
79. No Punishment for 'Hero' Giffen, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 22, 2010, 1:13
AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/11/22/no-punishment-for-hero-giffen.html.
Steve Levine has suggested that the request was "exquisitely timed," given that the
Bush Administration was at the time extraordinarily sensitive about releasing even
unclassified documents. See Steve Levine, James Giffen Update, FCPA PROFESSOR
(June 3, 2010, 6:32 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/06/james-giffen-
update.html; see also Elizabeth Spahn, Discovering Secrets: Act of State Defenses to
Bribery Cases, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 163, 172-73 (2009).
80. Giffen, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
81. James Giffen and America's Secrets, FCPA BLOG (July 15, 2009, 8:12
PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/7/15/james-giffen-and-americas-
secrets.html.
82. Koehler, supra note 73.
83. See Information 1-2, Giffen, 326 F. Supp. 2d 497 (No. S4 03 Cr. 404),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/35488211/Giffen-James-S4-Information; see
also Letter from Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney, to William J. Schwartz, Attorney for
James Giffen (Aug. 6, 2010), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/35488184/Giffen-James-Plea-Agreement; Letter from Preet
Bharara, U.S. Attorney, to William J. Schwartz, Attorney for The Mercator Corp.
(Aug. 6, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/35488265/Mercator-
Corporation-Plea-Agreement.
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official.84 The substance of the negotiations that produced this
settlement, much like the produced documents, remains confidential.
But the comments of the federal district judge during the sentencing
hearing are telling. Without divulging the contents of the sealed
documents, the judge explained that Giffen had access "to the highest
levels of the Soviet Union," that he "advanced the strategic interests of
the United States and its interest in Central Asia," that "these
relationships, built up over a lifetime, were lost the day of his arrest.""
He further noted, "Suffice it to say, Mr. Giffen was a significant source
of information to the U.S. government and a conduit of secret
information from the Soviet Union during the Cold War.""6 He
described Giffen as a sort of Cold War hero and, ultimately, suggested
that the DOJ should never have brought the case."
Speculation on the precise pressures that resulted in this settlement
was rampant. The DOJ had arrested Giffen at the earliest stages of its
push to enforce the FCPA, which was a highly significant symbolic
gesture to the international business world." But many Kazakhstanis
speculated that it would ultimately go nowhere because it was not in the
interest of the United States to expose damaging information about the
Kazakhstan president." Investigative reporters suggested that "the U.S.
Government is not of one mind about the desirability of this
prosecution. The Justice Department is standing behind the prosecutors
involved . . . [but] the intelligence community, led by the CIA, wants
this case to go away because it is poised to reveal some embarrassing
chapters in their Central Asian playbook."90 An anonymous
"Washington insider" commented on a blog that "The diplomats
usually win over the prosecutors" and that "it would seem Kazakhstan
is too important to continue the Giffen case." 91
The Giffen case was the first example of political pressures
generally, and foreign policy pressures specifically, arising from
sources on which the public could only speculate. However, it would
84. David Glovin, Oil Dealer Giffen Avoids Prison in Onetime Bribe Case,
SAN DIEGO SOURCE: DAILY TRANSCRIPT (Nov. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.sddt.com/
News/article.cfm?SourceCode = 20101119faq&_t =Oil +Dealer+ Giffen+ Avoids+ Pris
on+in+Onetime+Bribe+Case.
85. Id.
86. Koehler, supra note 73.
87. No Punishment for 'Hero' Giffen, supra note 79.
88. Id.
89. Scott Horton, Kazakhgate Limps Along, HARPER'S MAG. (July 16, 2010,
4:07 PM), http://harpers.org/archive/2010/07/hbc-90007405.
90. Id.
91. James Giffen and America 's Secrets, supra note 8 1.
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prove but the start of a discernible pattern. The second such instance
concerned the German technology firm Siemens.9 2 Both the press
release announcing the charges against Siemens and the criminal
information made numerous bribery allegations, including over $800
million in corrupt payments to various foreign officials.9 The conduct
that had given rise to the enforcement action clearly consisted primarily
of bribery. But the criminal information contained no substantive
bribery charges; rather, the DOJ charged Siemens only with violations
of the FCPA's accounting provisions. Siemens ultimately agreed to a
fine of approximately $800 million, the largest in FCPA history, but
was never charged with a bribery violation. In its sentencing
memorandum, the DOJ tacitly alluded to its decision not to file such
charges, stating:
[T]he Department considered a number of factors in its
decisions regarding the overall disposition. Those factors
included, but were not limited to, Siemens' cooperation and
remediation efforts, as well as any collateral consequences,
including whether there would be disproportionate harm to the
shareholders, pension holders, employees, and other persons
not proven personally culpable, and the impact on the public,
arising from the prosecution. The Department's analysis of
collateral consequences included the consideration of the risk
94of debarment and exclusion from government contracts.
That is, a substantial factor in its decision was the possibility that
Siemens would be debarred from government contracts.
The third case in this pattern of political pressures influencing
FCPA enforcement concerned the British company BAE-the world's
second-largest defense contractor and fifth largest provider of defense
materials to the U.S. government. 95 Amid rumors that BAE had paid
substantial bribes to Saudi officials to obtain a contract for fighter jets,
the U.K.'s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) began investigating BAE in
2006. When a Saudi prince learned of the investigation, he initially
92. See Mike Koehler, The Fagade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L.
L. 907, 991 (2010). Siemens was subject to FCPA jurisdiction because its shares are
traded on the NYSE and certain subsidiaries with U.S. offices participated in the
bribery scheme. Id.
93. Id.at991-92.
94. Department's Sentencing Memorandum at 11, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-CR-367-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/siemens-sentencing-memo.pdf.
95. Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to
Debar?, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 775, 798, 800-01 (2011).
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threatened to rescind the contract and take his offer to another country.
When this did not deter the SFO, Saudi officials then threatened to cut
off all cooperation with the U.K. in gathering terrorism-related
intelligence.9 6 Tony Blair pressured the SFO to drop its investigation,
and explained, "[Llet me make one thing very clear to you-I don't
believe the investigation would have led anywhere except to the
complete wreckage of a vital strategic relationship for our country."
Seemingly disappointed by the SFO's soft line, the U.S. DOJ
initiated its own investigation of BAE and arrested the CEO in 2008.98
In 2010, it filed a criminal information that detailed a complex network
of illicit payments. It alleged that BAE sold aircraft and other
technology and services to the U.K. government, which in turn sold
them to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 99 It further alleged that BAE
transferred extraordinary sums, exceeding ten million British Pounds
and $9,000,000 U.S., to an intermediary's Swiss bank account with the
understanding that at least portions would then be channeled to an
unnamed Saudi official, rumored to be Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the
then-Ambassador to the United States."
The information was carefully phrased to support the FCPA's anti-
bribery provisions: it alleged that BAE was aware of a "high
probability" that the intermediary used the transferred money to make
an illicit payment to a government official,o and that BAE made
separate payments to Saudi officials "through various payment
mechanisms . . . in the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.""o2 However,
the DOJ ultimately did not charge BAE with a substantive bribery
violation. Instead, it charged BAE merely with conspiracy to make
false statements to the U.S. government, including a statement that it
had not knowingly violated the FCPA. 03 But despite the government's
tacit allegation here that BAE had knowingly violated the FCPA, it did
not charge BAE with a substantive FCPA violation. BAE ultimately
96. Id. at 798-99.
97. Id. at 799 (quoting Frontline: Black Money, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/blackmoney/etc/script.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (transcript
of PBS television broadcast of Apr. 7, 2009)).
98. Id.
99. Information 41, United States v. BAE Sys., No. 1: 10-cr-00035-JDB
(D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bae-systems/02-01-1Obaesystems-
info.pdf.
100. Koehler, supra note 92, at 995.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 994.
103. See Information 5, 9, BAESys., No. 1:10-cr-00035-JDB.
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pled guilty to the conspiracy charge and agreed to pay a $400 million
criminal fine."
Perhaps the government simply felt in the Siemens and BAE cases
that debarment was unfair. Substantially more likely, the government
decided that it could not afford to lose the benefits that these two
government contractors provided. Two scholars noted that, like the
investment banks that were too big to fail, BAE was "too big to
debar."'0o Such determinations would not likely have been made by the
DOJ in isolation; they were more likely made under the influence of
persons outside of, or above, the DOJ.
Giffen, BAE, and Siemens collectively raise the very strong
suspicion that foreign policy considerations have already impacted
FCPA enforcement. However, the bringing to bear of foreign policy
considerations on FCPA enforcement to date has been covert and ad
hoc, rather than transparent and systematic. Moreover, the Giffen case
is not the only instance of the U.S. government allegedly tolerating,
endorsing, or even paying bribes to carry out foreign policy objectives.
The U.S. government and/or its contractors have reportedly paid bribes
systematically to aid the war effort in Afghanistan; U.S. officials have
admitted accepting bribes from Afghanis in awarding constructing
contracts to local companies.o' Corruption and foreign policy are thus
intersecting in myriad and complex ways.
The infiltration of foreign policy considerations into anti-bribery
enforcement has raised at least three problems. First, it seems to
introduce a contradiction in U.S. anti-bribery policy in which the DOJ
will prosecute bribe payers, while other agencies will pay bribes or
tacitly condone it. Second, it suggests that the United States will
suspend FCPA enforcement actions under foreign policy pressure
without a transparent process or a coherent policy. We do not know
who has been involved in these higher-level decisions or what criteria
guided the decisions; it is the classic smoke-filled room. Third, the
Giffen and BAE examples illustrate the DOJ's tendency to enforce, or
attempt to enforce, the FCPA without regard to its impact on economic
or legal development, alliance-building, or other foreign policy
considerations. Indeed, these cases suggest that the United States has
been on both ends of the awkward and yet unexplored relationship
between anti-bribery law and foreign policy.
104. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and
Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), available at
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-cm-209.html.
105. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 95, at 775.
106. See U.S. Official Accepted Bribes from Afghans, PREssTV (May 14,
2011, 2:16 PM), http://www.presstv.ir/detail/179871.html.
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Four Unchartered Corners
These experiences suggest a need to achieve a higher level of
consistency and coherence in anti-corruption enforcement. We need to
intelligently consider how anti-corruption intersects with foreign policy
and can yield a coherent and effective international anti-corruption
agenda. Foreign policy considerations must promote our anti-corruption
effort, and not undermine it with suspect and covert practices that call
into question the legitimacy of the government's efforts.
I want to argue that an anti-corruption agenda that carefully
balances the various interests at stake, is founded on a sophisticated
understanding of global legal and economic conditions, benefits both
the United States and the nations in which it does business, and is
harmonized with broader foreign policy aims requires a new federal
office. This office, likely located outside the Department of Justice and
perhaps in the Department of State or Commerce, would need formal
legal authority to participate in the design and implementation of anti-
corruption policy. It could systematically study the various interests at
stake, the interrelationships between them, and render
recommendations for enforcement procedures or textual amendments.
Overall, it would have two specific objectives: (1) to ensure that anti-
corruption enforcement is consistent across agencies; and (2) to ensure
that such enforcement has the effect in developing countries of
promoting anti-corruption norms and protecting the victims of bribery.
This proposal will raise myriad administrative law questions about
the division of enforcement and policy functions within and across
agencies, the extent of executive and legislative control over agency
discretion, policy formulation in the absence of either adjudication or
rulemaking, and ultimately, the delegation of legislative authority to the
executive branch. What would be the nature of its authority over
DOJ/SEC decisions-merely advisory or more formal? Could it veto
enforcement decisions? What are the best examples of policy-oriented
offices having formal authority to influence enforcement decisions, and
which lessons do they teach? In addition to foreign policy advisory
power, should a new corruption office have features of other
administrative agencies, such as rulemaking authority, or administrative
adjudication? Relatedly, might a new corruption regime include a
private cause of action, something the FCPA now lacks? Future
research will address these questions conceptually and develop a more
specific blueprint for the design and operation of the office.
CONCLUSION: IMAGINE THERE'S No BRIBERY
The subtitle of this conclusion deliberately, if facetiously, evokes
John Lennon's utopian vision of a world without religious conflict;
indeed, some in anti-corruption circles many contend that the ideas
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suggested above are no less remote. But the current state of our anti-
corruption deliberations reflects a legal subdiscipline truly in its
infancy-the United States government began enforcing the FCPA a
mere decade ago, and academics began rigorously studying the FCPA
even more recently. We probably understand international anti-
corruption law as well now as we did the federal securities laws (to
which the FCPA is an amendment) in the 1940s or 1950s. As with
those laws, the movement toward effective universal anti-corruption
law will be measured, as it has been thus far, not in years but in
decades.
Accordingly, this paper takes a longer-term view of anti-corruption
reforms. It is an initial attempt to locate the fascinating and complex
problems of anti-corruption law in a broader intellectual context.
Ensuing articles will draw on diverse academic literatures to understand
anti-corruption law more broadly and, in turn, will seek to contribute
something novel from the anti-corruption experience to those well-
established debates. Ultimately, this paper marks out a nascent research
project in the hopes that other scholars will similarly broaden their
analyses of anti-corruption law and policy.
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